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Abstract 
Competitive balance of league competitions is an important component of sport 
economics. Evidence suggests that a less attractive product might struggle to 
command a high market value. Thus, it is imperative that sport leagues remain 
competitively balanced with a degree of uncertainty of outcome. This paper 
analyses competitive balance within the English football league system since 
the inception of the English Premier League (EPL) in 1992. It examines 
variations in overall competitive balance within and between the EPL and the 
three divisions that make up the Football League. Competition for the title, 
promotion and relegation is also analysed. The results indicate a reduction in 
competitive balance in the EPL over time and that the EPL is less balanced 
overall relative to the Football League, which is partly influenced by the higher 
financial disparity between teams in the EPL. Nonetheless, fan interest in the 
EPL and the value of broadcasting deals do not appear to be negatively 
influenced. 
Key words: competitiveness, English Premier League, English Football League, football 
finance 
 
  
1. Introduction 
The English football league structure currently consists of four leagues that compete in an 
open league format where a promotion and relegation system is in place and clubs can thus 
move between leagues dependent on sporting performance. The four leagues in hierarchical 
order are: the English Premier League (EPL) (tier 1); the Football League Championship (tier 
2); the Football League One (tier 3); and, the Football League Two (tier 4). In terms of 
organisational structure and governance the leagues are self-regulating although there is an 
internal separation in a sense that the EPL primarily governs itself and the other three tiers 
operate under a separate structure more commonly known as the English Football League. 
The organisational structure of these leagues creates divisions from a revenue perspective as 
the funds available are not shared equally between the leagues. 
The primary aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the debate surrounding 
competitive balance in the English football league system by analysing the level of 
competition within and between the individual leagues that make up the industry. To the 
authors' knowledge, this is the first paper of its kind to consider competitive balance within 
this particular industry, particularly in terms of the focus on the lower tiers (primarily tiers 2, 
3 and 4) and, as such, the paper directly contributes to sport economics literature. 
Furthermore, the findings of the paper have implications at policy level for both clubs and 
league authorities with a view to safeguarding the prestige and viability of its domestic league 
competitions.  
The rest of the paper is structured in the following order. Section 2 provides relevant 
background information on the English football league system, including the financial 
disparity between leagues, which provides the rationale for tracking competitive balance 
within and between leagues. An overview of relevant economic theory is presented in Section 
3 and Section 4 summarises previous competitive balance research. The methods are 
presented in Section 5. The results and discussion follow in Section 6 and Section 7 
respectively. The paper concludes by identifying the main learning points and direction for 
future research in Section 8. 
2. Background 
At the time of writing, the EPL is the highest revenue generating league in European football 
grossing €3.9bn (£3.3bn) in 2013/14, €1.6bn ahead of its nearest rival the Bundesliga in 
Germany (Deloitte, 2015). In contrast, the total revenue of Football League Championship 
clubs was £491m with League One and League Two seeing a more substantial gap with total 
revenues of £148m and £78m respectively.  
Primarily this absolute financial gap is due to the broadcasting deals in place for EPL clubs. 
Under the current deal, which expires after the 2015/16 season, even the bottom three clubs 
in the league table that are relegated can expect to earn a substantial amount of prize money 
from broadcasting payments. For example, Aston Villa finished bottom of the EPL in 
2015/16 and still earned £66m in revenue from broadcasting. This is in contrast to the 
Championship where the current guaranteed income from broadcasting is around £5m. 
Furthermore, the new broadcasting deal that commences in the 2016/17 season is worth 
£5.1bn in UK rights alone, which represents a 70% increase on the current £3bn deal. In light 
of this increase, a conservative estimate is that even the bottom club in the EPL in 2016/17 
would earn around £92m in broadcasting revenue assuming the distribution mechanism 
remains the same whilst the guaranteed income in the Championship from broadcasting 
would only rise slightly to £6.5m.  
The financial benefits and rewards of competing in the EPL make it easy to see why clubs in 
the Football League aspire to gain promotion and compete in England's elite league 
competition. There are further disparities and arguments, however, which reflect the financial 
gap between the two leagues, the sustainability of clubs within the Football League and the 
nature of competition in the industry itself. One such disparity often cited in discussions on 
this subject is the clubs that are in receipt of 'parachute payments' having been relegated from 
the EPL. The EPL distributes parachute payments to clubs that have been relegated in an 
attempt to reduce the financial impact of relegation. Under the current agreement, parachute 
payments total around £65m over four years. A relegated club receives £25m in year one, 
£20m in year two and £10m per year in years three and four. Once again, a conservative 
estimate is that under the new broadcasting deal commencing in 2016/17, parachute 
payments may total an estimated £85-90m spread out in this case across three years instead of 
four. For the year end 2013, the £25m parachute payments distributed to the three relegated 
EPL clubs from the previous season was higher than the total revenue of 19 out of 24 
Championship clubs (Deloitte, 2014). To put this into perspective, based on the total revenue 
figures for the Championship and League One, these parachute payments create a further 
financial imbalance in absolute revenue terms. For example, the total revenue for 
Championship clubs of £491m in 2013/14 was an absolute increase of £54m from the 
previous year. However, this figure was boosted by a £57m increase in parachute payments 
due to the clubs competing in that league for that season meaning that if these payments were 
to be ignored then the collective revenues of the league would have actually declined by £3m. 
A similar scenario occurred in the same season in League One where the total revenue of 
£148m was boosted by over £19m of parachute payments to Wolverhampton Wanderers, thus 
giving a slightly inflated figure (Deloitte, 2015). Moreover, in 2012/13 the average 
wages/revenue ratio for Championship clubs was 105%, the second consecutive season with 
a ratio of over 100%, and almost half of the clubs in the Championship had wage costs 
greater than revenue (Deloitte, 2015). 
This suggests that clubs competing in the Football League are overspending in an attempt to 
reach the EPL although such levels of spending, particularly on player wages, poses a 
significant risk to clubs' medium to long-term viability with serious implications on the 
requirement for owner financing. There has been much discussion over recent seasons about 
the effect of parachute payments on the competitive balance of the Championship although 
much of this discussion has come from industry commentators rather than empirical 
academic research. For example, Deloitte (2014) state that on-pitch competition remains 
intense in this division, with higher levels of revenue no guarantee of a higher league placing, 
yet there is little doubt that the parachute payments awarded to relegated clubs do provide 
them with a financial advantage over the majority of clubs in the division.  
3. The economic theory of professional team sports 
Whilst the scope of this paper is not to compare economic models of professional sports 
leagues, it is important to be aware of the academic debates in the field. It also helps us to 
provide the context and rationale for this paper in the situational context of English 
professional football and the three governing bodies that have outright control of the English 
leagues (The FA, EPL and EFL). All have conflicting interests and all, fundamentally, want 
what is best for their respective league. However, under an open league structure, their 
actions have consequences and can alter the dynamics of the league and competition. Given 
such dynamics, it is important that the league managers are aware of the impact of any 
actions they may take when considering the competitive balance of the league(s). To that end, 
this paper offers a valuable contribution, providing insights for league managers as to how 
they manage their respective strategies with the ultimate goal of providing viewers and fans 
with the best 'joint' product on the pitch. 
A number of papers referenced in this section state that the perfect game is a symbiotic 
contest between equally matched opponents, essentially through the acquisition of equal 
playing talent. The practical economic problem is that professional sport leagues form 
imperfectly competitive natural cartels where games are played between teams with 
asymmetric market power (Vrooman, 2015). This notion implies that dominant teams may 
only be as strong as their weakest opponent. Comparisons between the economic 
environment of professional team sports and that of more traditional commercial businesses 
have been well documented by sports economists (e.g. Dobson and Goddard, 2011; Leach 
and Szymanski, 2015). Professional team sports are intrinsically different from other 
businesses, in which a firm is likely to prosper if it can eliminate competition and establish a 
position as a monopoly supplier (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). In sport, however, it does not 
pay for one team to establish such a position due to the joint nature of 'production' in sports. 
According to Rottenberg's (1956) Invariance Principle, player talent in a league would move 
to the team which valued them the most, invariant of team revenues. That is, players will 
eventually end up on the team where they have the highest value of use to that franchise. El-
Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) have extended the IP in 
their models to gate revenue sharing by showing that sharing revenue has no effect on player 
allocation within a league. The result of this is of notable importance to professional team 
sports in general and league managers in particular as revenue sharing has been introduced in 
some leagues as a means to improve competitive balance (see also Dietl, Grossman and Lang, 
2011). The IP with respect to revenue sharing was originally developed under the 
assumptions of purely profit-maximizing clubs and Walrasian conjectures (El-Hodiri and 
Quirk, 1971; Fort and Quirk, 1995). In their models, Kesenne (2000, 2005) and Vrooman 
(2007, 2008) show that the IP does not hold in a league with purely win-maximising clubs. 
Moreover, Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) provide a model that contradicts the IP even under 
the assumption of purely profit-maximising clubs. They show that under contest-Nash 
conjectures, revenue sharing does not increase but rather decreases competitive balance (see 
also Dietl and Lang, 2008; Vrooman, 2009). This result is driven by the so-called dulling 
effect of revenue sharing. It suggests that revenue sharing reduces the incentives for clubs to 
invest in playing talent because each club has to share some of the resulting marginal benefits 
of its talent investment with the other clubs in the league (see also Cyrenne, 2009). 
Different models of a sports league have since been proposed in academic discourse. Madden 
(2011) suggest a "strategic market game" (SMG) approach to modelling strategic interactions 
between clubs and generalising the basic league framework in much of the previous literature 
to allow variable talent supply and club revenues that depend on absolute and relative team 
qualities. Following this, Winfree and Fort (2012) offer a general model in response to some 
of the literature cited above. This model expands dimensions to include Nash conjectures for 
both open and closed leagues and the explicit presence of investment in talent, without 
functional forms. Winfree and Fort (2013: 328) argue that: "….with such a model, future 
researchers can simply use it and impose whatever assumptions they choose while being 
forced to recognize their impact." The following paragraphs detail a brief comparison 
between two prevalent models of sport leagues; the North American and European models.  
Principally, professional team sports are heavily linked to the concepts of uncertainty of 
outcome, competitive balance and profit and utility maximisation (e.g. Buraimo et al., 2015; 
Fort, 2015; Kesenne, 2015; Leach and Szymanski, 2015; Sloane, 2015; Vrooman, 2015). The 
theoretical literature on the determinants of the degree of competitive inequality in sports 
leagues was developed by US sports economists, with North American team sports primarily 
in mind. Naturally, the development of this literature has led to comparisons between the 
North American and European model (see Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Andreff and 
Staudohar, 2000; Sloane, 2006; Szymanski, 2003). The European model is and will remain 
unique, but there appears to be convergence on certain features. In both Europe and the 
United States, sports leagues are joint ventures that can be viewed as a single entity or cartel. 
Clubs are separately owned with discretion to set prices, market the games, and adopt 
strategies to compete with other clubs. There are, however, several key differences between 
the two models, all of which ultimately have an impact on factors such as revenue generation 
and ability to compete. For example, the American sports model operates a draft system 
where the best performing rookie is assigned to the worst performing team. Furthermore, 
some American sport leagues operate under salary caps, share television revenue equally and 
compete exclusively in domestically structured leagues (aside from a handful of Canadian 
franchises (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). In place of promotion and relegation, evident 
throughout the European model, changes in American leagues come from adding new 
franchises and relocating franchises to another city. There are also other external factors, 
particularly within English football and the EPL, such as owner investment, Financial Fair 
Play (regulations originally devised by UEFA to curb excessive overspending and promote 
financial sustainability) and revenue gained from Pan-European competitions such as the 
UEFA Champions League that have been cited as having a potential to directly impact on 
competitive balance (e.g. Pawlowski, Breuer and Hovemann, 2010; Ramchandani, 2012).  
Precisely why such differences have arisen in the two continents has never been fully 
explained (Sloane, 2015). However, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) contrast the 
development of football and baseball, with the former spreading throughout the world. 
Football was influenced by British expatriates and local elites, whilst baseball was much 
more inward looking and concerned with commercial development. Previous literature has 
suggested that profit maximisation is the prime objective of North American leagues and 
team owners, so profitability is the main factor influencing decisions concerning the award of 
franchises and relocation (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). Contrastingly, other authors have 
proposed that the European sport model is more closely related to utility or 'win' 
maximisation (see Sloane, 1971; Kesenne, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro and Szymanski, 2009). It 
must also be noted that very few markets can be classified as perfectly competitive or as a 
pure monopoly (Gratton and Taylor, 2000). The vast majority of firms do compete with other 
firms, often quite aggressively, and yet they are not price-takers. Most markets, therefore, lie 
between the two extremes of monopoly and perfect competition, in the realm of 'imperfect 
competition'. Within this, lies monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The Football League 
in England, it can be argued, is most closely related to monopolistic competition as all clubs 
are essentially selling the same product, albeit at different prices. 
Both models of professional team sport (European and North American) consider the 
importance of competitive balance in their structure and the implications it may have on 
demand for the 'product'. Indeed, in relation to successful sport leagues, Groot (2008) stated 
that "each competitor has an inherent interest in maintaining the health of their rivals" (p. 25). 
A potential implication in this context is that an excessively imbalanced competition might 
have a negative effect on fan interest and, hence, on demand (Kesenne, 2006; Zimbalist, 
2003). The contrast in these studies is also reflective of wider issues in relation to competitive 
balance research. As Pawlowski (2013) states, it may be that the empirical evidence is 
'wrong' because the proxies used to measure competitive balance are inadequate. On the other 
hand, even if the empirical evidence is 'right', it does not necessarily show that competitive 
balance is irrelevant to football fans but rather that the variations in competitive balance that 
have actually been observed have not been large enough to affect demand. Pawlowski (2013) 
poses that a crucial question, from a fans perspective, is how unbalanced does a football 
league have to be before it matters? The answer to this question is crucial to league organisers 
and the primary aim of this paper will go some way towards answering important questions 
such as this one. In any case, the vast majority of literature surrounding the economics of 
professional team sports is concerned with competitive balance. Indeed, Dobson and Goddard 
(2011) proclaim that the problem of measuring competitive balance within a sports league 
has attracted considerable attention in the academic sport economics literature in recent years. 
Researchers have applied several measures of concentration or inequality, some of which are 
borrowed from industrial economics, to sports teams' win ratio or league points data. 
4. Previous research on competitive balance 
Fort and Maxcy (2003) categorise the theoretical and empirical literature on competitive 
balance along distinct two lines: (i) analysis of competitive balance (ACB) literature, which 
focuses on what has happened to competitive balance over time or as a result of changes in 
the business practices of sports leagues; and, (ii) literature on competitive balance that 
analyses its effect on fans, i.e. which tests the longstanding uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis (UOH). It is the first of these approaches (i.e. ACB) that this research is concerned 
with. Although the concept of competitive balance has received substantial coverage in 
academic literature, historically, the focus of such studies has been on sports leagues in North 
America, primarily in Major League Baseball, but also in the National Basketball Association, 
the National Football League and the National Ice Hockey League (for examples see: Maxcy 
and Mondello, 2006; Zimbalist, 2002). In more recent years, there have been a number of 
studies that have focused on competitive balance in professional team sports in Europe, most 
notably in football but occasionally in other sports such as rugby union (e.g. Williams, 2012). 
There are also one or two studies that focus on other professional sports such as Formula One 
(Schreyer and Torgler, 2016) and tennis (Del Corral, 2009), although these are less relevant 
given the respective nature of these more individual sports compared to professional team 
sports. 
In relation to professional football, previous research examining competitive balance has 
almost exclusively focused on the so called 'big five leagues' (England, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain) with a small number focusing on smaller leagues such as Austria and 
Switzerland (e.g. Pawlowski and Nalbantis, 2015). Aside from these papers, it appears that 
little attention has been given to football leagues in other European countries (Ramchandani, 
2012). Some studies detect no significant changes in competitive balance across European 
leagues (e.g. Goossens, 2006: German, French and Spanish first divisions; Groot, 2008: 
French and Spanish first divisions; Koning, 2000: Dutch first division; Michie and Oughton, 
2004: French first division; Szymanski, 2001: English first division), whilst others report a 
decline in competitive balance (Goossens, 2006: English and Italian first divisions; Groot, 
2008: English, German, Italian and Dutch first divisions; Montes, Sala-Garrido and Usai, 
2014: Spanish first division). 
There are many indices proposed and employed for measuring competitive balance, a number 
of which can be found in the texts of Groot (2008) and Michie and Oughton (2004). Whilst 
competitive balance in both European football and North American sports has been analysed 
in a number of previous studies, no research to date, to the authors knowledge, has examined 
the competitive balance of the whole English football league system. 
5. Methods 
The formation of the EPL in 1992 brought about a change in the structure of the English 
football league system. In 1992/1993 there were four leagues in total - the EPL and three 
divisions below under the umbrella of the Football League. The Football League has been 
rebranded in recent years and the divisions are currently referred to as the Championship, 
League One and League Two.  The first season of the EPL comprised 22 teams with 24 teams 
in the Championship and in League One and 22 teams in League Two. A restructure since the 
start of the 1995/1996 season meant that the EPL now has 20 clubs competing in it with 24 
clubs competing in each division of the Football League - see Table 1.  
<Table 1 about here> 
EPL and Football League results for the period 1992/93 to 2015/16 (24 seasons) were 
collated from official websites and analysed using SPSS.  The crux of our analysis is the 
number of points achieved by all teams in the EPL and the Football League in this time frame. 
We explicitly excluded any points deductions imposed on teams as this would have the 
potential to artificially skew the results of the research. For example, in the 2011/12 season 
Portsmouth (competing in the Championship) were given a 10-point deduction for entering 
administration and their final points total in the official league table was 40. However, they 
achieved 50 points based on their results which was the figure used in our analysis. 
There are a variety of measurement techniques when considering competitive balance in 
professional team sports and that each has their own respective strengths and weaknesses (see 
Mills and Fort, 2014; Owen and King, 2015). Fort, Maxcy and Diehl (2016) review the 
empirical literature on competitive balance including game and season uncertainty, primarily 
in the context of North American sports leagues. The most commonly used measure in 
studies of competitive balance in North American sports leagues, where drawn games are rare 
or non-existent, is the standard deviation of team winning percentage within a season.  In 
sports like football, where drawn games are possible and common, winning percentage might 
be a biased indicator (Pawlowski et al., 2010). This paper utilises Mitchie and Oughton's 
(2004) Herfindahl Index of Competitive Balance (HICB) which is an industry standard 
measure adapted from Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The rationale for using HICB to measure 
overall league concentration is two-fold. First, it has been used in previous academic research 
focusing on football leagues (see for example, Lenton, 2008; Pawlowski et al., 2010); second, 
it allows comparisons between leagues, with a different number of teams and, within leagues 
when the number of teams changes over time. HICB scores were calculated using the formula 
(HHI / (1/N)) x 100, where HHI is the sum of the squares of the points share for each club 
contesting a league in a given season and N is the number of teams in that particular league 
and season.  For a perfectly balanced league of any size, the index takes a value of 100. As 
the index rises, competitive balance declines. For a league of any size, the lower bound of the 
HICB would be 100 (the value attained in a perfectly balanced league). In a 20-24 team 
league, the upper bound would be 136-137 (the value attained in a perfectly unbalanced 
league with the most unequal distribution of points attainable). The upper bound in this case 
is capped by the constraints imposed by the points scoring system i.e. teams can only win 
points in the matches that they contest and so it is not possible for teams to win all of the 
points in the league. Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) was used to examine the pattern of 
HICB within each league over time. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and post hoc 
tests were to determine the statistical significance of the differences in HICB scores between 
leagues. 
Apart from examining competitive balance between leagues at an overall level using HICB, 
the research also examined specific aspects of competitive balance that are likely to be of 
interest to both fans and league authorities: competition for the title; competition for 
promotion; and, competition for survival. By incorporating these techniques the research 
builds on similar methods employed in the extant literature such as the C5 concentration ratio 
(e.g. Michie and Oughton, 2004) and the top 25% and top 50% concentration ratios (e.g. 
Ramchandani, 2012). The time frame chosen for this analysis was 2002/03 to 2015/16 (14 
seasons) because the structure of all four leagues under consideration has remained internally 
consistent in terms of league size as well as the number of teams being promoted directly, 
qualifying for play-off places or being relegated - see Table 2. 
<Table 2 about here> 
Across all four leagues, competition for the title was measured in terms of the gap between 
the points per match won by the team finishing first and the average points per match won by 
other likely title contenders, who were judged to be the teams that finished second, third and 
fourth. In 2015/16 for example, Leicester won the EPL title accumulating 81 points. The 
average number of points won by teams that finished second (Arsenal, 71 points), third 
(Tottenham, 70 points) and fourth (Manchester City, 66 points) was 69.  All EPL teams 
played 38 games and therefore the gap in terms of the competition for the title was 0.32 
points per match (i.e. (81 - 69) / 38). 
The EPL is the top tier of English football therefore the competition for promotion was only 
examined in relation to the Football League.  For the Championship and League One, this 
was calculated as the gap between the average points per match won by the top six teams (1-6 
are promoted directly or qualify for play-offs) and the average points per match won by the 
next six teams (7-12).  For League Two we examined the difference between the top seven 
teams (1-7 are promoted directly or qualify for play-offs) and the next seven teams (8-14). 
To investigate the competition for survival, we compared the average points per match of the 
teams that were relegated from the league - those ranked 18-20 in the EPL, 21-24 in the 
Championship, 21-24 in League One and 23-24 in League Two - with the equivalent number 
of teams that finished directly above them in the league - those ranked 15-17 in the EPL, 17-
20 in the Championship, 17-20 in League One and 21-22 in League Two. 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to establish whether differences between leagues in the 
competitiveness for the title, promotion and survival were statistically significant. Post hoc 
tests were also undertaken for statistically significant differences. 
6. Results 
6.1. Overall competitive balance 
Table 3 presents the HICB scores for the English EPL and the three divisions of the Football 
League in England in each completed season between 1992/93 and 2015/16. With the 
passage of time (where 1 = 1992/93 and 24 = 2015/16), there has been a moderately strong 
and statistically significant decline in competitive balance in the EPL (r = 0.63, p < 0.001). 
The relationship between time (season) and competitive balance in the Football League is 
modest in comparison, with the Pearson correlation coefficients ranging between -0.08 
(League Two) to 0.27 (the Championship), and also statistically insignificant in each instance 
(p > 0.05). In other words, there is no discernible trend in how competitive balance has 
changed in the Football League over the 24 seasons under consideration. 
<Table 3 about here> 
The range of the HICB score for each league is plotted in Figure 1, which reveals three key 
points. First, there appears to be greater variation in competitive balance in the EPL (with a 
10% differential between the most competitive and least competitive scores) compared with 
the Football League (where the corresponding differential is less than 5%). Second, looking 
across the three divisions of the Football League there are only marginal variations in the best, 
worst and average (mean) HICB scores between these leagues. Third, the least balanced 
season in each division of the Football league has an HICB score of 107, but this score is still 
below the average (mean) HICB score for the EPL (109).  
<Figure 1 about here> 
What this data indicates is that competition in the top tier of English football is generally 
lower than in the Football League and that the three divisions of Football league have broadly 
similar levels of competitive balance. This assertion was tested statistically using one-way 
ANOVA and post-hoc tests. HICB scores for each league were normally distributed as 
determined by Shaprio-Wilks test (p > 0.05) and no outliers were detected from inspection of 
boxplots. The homogeneity of variances assumption was violated, as assessed by Levene's 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances (p = 0.002), so a Welch F test was conducted. HICB score 
was found to be statistically different between the leagues (Welch's F (3, 50) = 15.935, p < 
0.001). A Games-Howell post-hoc test revealed that the HICB scores for all Football League 
divisions were statistically significantly lower in comparison with the EPL (p < 0.001). There 
were no statistically significant differences in HICB scores between the Championship and 
League One (p = 0.680), between the Championship and League Two (p = 0.897) and 
between League One and League Two (p = 0.228). These results validate the previous 
assertion about the level of competitive balance in the four leagues.  
6.2. Competition for the title 
For each season and league between 2002/03 and 2015/16, Table 4 shows the difference in 
the points achieved by the team that won the league title and the average number of points 
achieved by the teams that finished in second, third and fourth place. This difference is 
expressed on a 'points per match' basis to facilitate a better comparison between the EPL and 
the Football League. Each team in the EPL contests 38 matches whereas those in the Football 
League divisions contest 46 matches. Lower gap scores in Table 4 indicate better competition 
for the title. 
<Table 4 about here> 
There was a statistically significant difference between leagues as determined by a one-way 
ANOVA (F(3,52) = 5.678, p = 0.002). A Tukey HSD test revealed that the mean gap score 
was statistically significantly lower in the case of League Two (0.16, p < 0.001) compared to 
the EPL (0.32). No statistically significant differences in the mean gap scores were detected 
in the Football League (p > 0.05) between the Championship (0.23), League One (0.22) and 
League Two (0.16). 
6.3. Competition for promotion 
The promotion criterion applies to the Football League only. Table 5 shows the gap between 
the average points per match achieved by teams being either promoted directly in each league 
(two each in the Championship and League One and three in League Two) or finishing in 
play-off positions (four teams in each league) between 2002/03 and 2015/16 and the average 
points per match achieved by the equivalent number of teams finishing immediately outside 
the play-off positions (six each in the Championship and League One and seven in League 
Two). 
A one-way ANOVA did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the mean 
gap scores for the Championship (0.34), League One (0.37) and League Two (0.35) (F(2,39) 
= 0.680, p = 0.513). 
<Table 5 about here>  
6.4. Competition for survival 
Table 6 shows the absolute gap between the average points per match achieved by teams 
being relegated from each league (three in the EPL, four each in the Championship and 
League One and two in League Two) between 2002/03 and 2015/16 and the average points 
per match achieved by the equivalent number of teams finishing immediately above the 
relegation zone. 
<Table 6 about here> 
There was statistically significant difference in the mean gap scores between the leagues 
(Welch's F (3, 28) = 5.541, p = 0.004). A Games-Howell post-hoc test revealed that the mean 
gap score for League Two (0.14) was statistically significantly lower (indicating better 
competitive balance) in comparison with the EPL (0.22) (p = 0.039) and the Championship 
(0.21) (p = 0.004). There were no statistically significant differences in the mean gap scores 
between the EPL (0.22), the Championship (0.21) and League One (0.18) (p > 0.05), and 
between League One (0.18) and League Two (0.14) (p = 0.103). 
7. Discussion 
Our results indicate a trend of declining overall competitive balance in the EPL over the 24 
seasons since 1992/93. In the context of the recent increase in broadcasting rights deals cited 
in the introduction, this decline in competitive balance appears to contradict the notion that 
increasingly imbalanced sport competitions have the potential to negatively influence stadium 
attendance and TV viewership figures (Pawlowski, 2013). Indeed, EPL stadium capacity 
utilisation currently stands at 96% (Deloitte, 2015) and the latest TV deal increased in value 
by 60% for the UK rights alone. On this evidence, there is nothing to suggest that a decline in 
competitive balance of the EPL is having an adverse effect on fan interest.  
It has been suggested that changes in competitive balance in domestic football leagues are 
related to the increased value of pay-outs from Pan-European competitions (Pawlowski et al, 
2010). There is a further argument that the apparent decline in competitive balance over time 
in the case of the EPL might also be explained by the increase in takeover of club ownership 
by foreign investors, many of whom are willing to invest sizeable sums of money on player 
acquisition in an attempt to enhance sporting performance (Ramchandani, 2012). Obvious 
examples in recent years include Chelsea in 2003 and Manchester City in 2008, whose 
owners were able to invest heavily in the team prior to the introduction of Financial Fair Play 
regulations. Both these viewpoints appear logical given our analysis that shows the EPL is 
significantly less balanced than the Football League. 
There is a considerable financial gap (in revenue terms) between the EPL and the Football 
League. The collective revenue of EPL clubs is £3.3bn whilst the total revenue of the 
Football League is substantially lower (Championship = £491m, League One = £148m, 
League Two = £78m). This means that in the context of the English football industry, the 
EPL (tier 1) clubs, in absolute revenue terms, earn nearly seven times the revenues of 
Championship (tier 2) clubs, 22 times the revenue of League One (tier 3) clubs and almost 42 
times the revenues of League Two (tier 4) clubs. Furthermore, the Championship figure is 
skewed slightly as it includes some clubs in receipt of parachute payments from the EPL. The 
revenue gap is further enhanced when considering the difference between the highest and 
lowest revenue generating clubs within the leagues. For example, taking the most recent 
figures available from 2014, the highest revenue generating club in the EPL was Manchester 
United with £433m compared to the lowest revenue generating club Cardiff City (£83m). 
This reflects an absolute financial gap in revenue terms of £350m. In contrast the highest 
earning club in the Championship in 2014 was Wigan Athletic (£39m) compared to the 
lowest revenue generating club Yeovil Town (£8m). This gives an absolute revenue gap in 
the Championship of £31m - significantly less than the £350m gap in the EPL which could 
partially help to explain the relative difference in competitive balance between leagues. 
In the context of these figures, perhaps a significant difference in competitive balance 
between leagues might be expected. However, there are no significant differences in the 
overall level of competition observed between the three leagues that make up the Football 
League, despite there being a substantial absolute revenue gap between them. This arguably 
underlines the strength of the Football League in England relative to other European football 
league systems such as Germany, Italy, Holland and Spain where there has been a decline in 
competitive balance in recent years (e.g. Goossens, 2006; Groot, 2008; Montes, Sala-Garrido 
and Usai, 2014). It also demonstrates to the English Football League authorities that their 
leagues have similar levels of competition overall and that there are no immediate concerns 
regarding their structure and format.  
A study by Plumley et al. (2017) found that football club performance, in relation to a 
mixture of financial and sporting factors, varies over time in cycles. It is highly probable that 
teams relegated from the EPL sometimes suffer consecutive relegations and end up 
competing in League One (e.g. Blackpool FC, Portsmouth FC, Wigan Athletic and 
Wolverhampton Wanderers in recent seasons). These teams would be more likely to be 
stronger in these leagues in terms of playing talent compared to other teams given that they 
would still be in receipt of parachute payments. For example, following relegation from the 
EPL in 2011/12 Wolverhampton Wanderers received a parachute payment of £19m when 
competing in League One in 2013/14 (following consecutive relegations). This figure is 
higher than the average revenue per club in League One for the same season (£6.1m). Very 
rarely do these teams drop into League Two and, vice versa, very rarely do teams from 
League Two get promoted beyond League One. As such, the competition for the title, 
promotion and survival in League Two could be conceivably contested by a more equal 
standard of team each season. 
8. Conclusion 
Our research has provided a novel insight into the nature of competitive balance within and 
between the four football leagues in England. It is the EPL that stands out as the least 
balanced league in English football. The recommendation for the EPL then is to consider how 
factors such as Pan-European competition revenues, ownership funding and facility fees from 
broadcasting deals may be affecting the competitive balance of the league itself. We have 
already seen the introduction of Financial Fair Play in an attempt to curb overspending on 
players through ownership injections, but the EPL may wish to consider a more equitable 
distribution of the broadcasting payments they receive and analyse how Pan-European 
competition revenues may be further affecting the competitive balance of the league. A 
bolder suggestion would be for the EPL to propose a more unequal distribution of 
broadcasting revenues, perhaps mirroring the NFL in America where the bottom teams 
actually get more revenue than those at the top. However, in response to the question posed 
by Pawlowski (2013) about how unbalanced a football league has to be before it matters to 
fans, it would appear that we have not yet reached a tipping point where fan interest in the 
EPL is becoming negatively influenced. For the Football League, it appears that the three 
divisions remain similarly balanced although there is a suggestion that further negotiations 
could be had with the EPL to argue for a more equal distribution of solidarity payments to 
close the absolute financial gap between the Football League and the EPL. Our research 
suggests that no fundamental change in format and structure of the Football League is 
warranted.  Future research should focus specifically on the finances within the English game 
and in particular whether and how the parachute payments paid to clubs relegated from the 
EPL affect competitive balance in lower tiers of English football. 
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Table 1: League sizes 
League Time Period Teams 
EPL 
1992/93 - 1994/95 22 
1995/96 - 2015/16 20 
Championship 1992/93 - 2015/16 24 
League One 1992/93 - 2015/16 24 
League Two 
1992/93 - 1994/95 22 
1995/96 - 2015/16 24 
 
Table 2: League structure 
League Time Period 
Number of Teams 
Direct 
Promotion 
Play-off 
Position 
Relegated 
EPL 
1992/93 - 1993/94 NA NA 3 
1994/95 NA NA 4 
1995/96 - 2015/16 NA NA 3 
Championship 
1992/93 - 1993/94 2 4 3 
1994/95 1 4 4 
1995/96 - 2015/16 2 4 3 
League One 
1992/93- 2015/16 2 4 4 
1994/95 1 4 5 
1995/96 - 2015/16 2 4 4 
League Two 
1992/93 3 4 1 
1993/94 - 1995/96 3 4 0 
1996/97 - 2001/02 3 4 1 
2002/03 - 2015/16 3 4 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: HICB scores for the EPL and Football League  
Season EPL 
Football League 
Championship League One League Two 
1992-93 103.15 105.00 106.42 105.66 
1993-94 107.13 103.22 105.66 103.79 
1994-95 107.85 103.07 107.29 107.21 
1995-96 108.05 102.35 105.12 105.39 
1996-97 105.17 104.03 104.22 103.39 
1997-98 105.38 106.13 103.14 106.33 
1998-99 107.09 106.56 105.44 102.79 
1999-00 108.93 106.17 107.01 104.87 
2000-01 106.87 106.40 106.43 104.70 
2001-02 109.80 106.27 105.66 106.32 
2002-03 108.09 105.20 106.32 103.88 
2003-04 108.22 105.19 104.50 104.72 
2004-05 110.45 105.36 105.35 103.94 
2005-06 111.65 106.59 102.61 103.27 
2006-07 108.79 104.44 104.68 104.85 
2007-08 113.68 102.82 105.11 106.31 
2008-09 111.62 104.20 106.44 104.43 
2009-10 111.48 105.55 107.16 104.62 
2010-11 105.86 104.48 105.06 103.66 
2011-12 110.54 104.92 107.25 105.80 
2012-13 111.33 102.39 104.11 102.53 
2013-14 112.52 106.84 106.69 102.94 
2014-15 109.27 107.23 104.91 105.58 
2015-16 108.49 106.68 105.16 107.26 
 
Table 4: Competition for the title 
Season 
Premier  
League 
Football League 
Championship League 1 League 2 
2002-03 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.13 
2003-04 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.19 
2004-05 0.56 0.25 0.39 0.08 
2005-06 0.36 0.49 0.13 0.12 
2006-07 0.42 0.13 0.17 0.07 
2007-08 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.21 
2008-09 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.14 
2009-10 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.30 
2010-11 0.26 0.14 0.20 0.13 
2011-12 0.34 0.12 0.28 0.17 
2012-13 0.36 0.22 0.09 0.12 
2013-14 0.11 0.35 0.31 0.10 
2014-15 0.32 0.07 0.28 0.17 
2015-16 0.32 0.13 0.08 0.30 
 
 
 
Table 5: Competition for promotion  
Season 
Football League 
Championship League One League Two 
2002-03 0.38 0.47 0.32 
2003-04 0.24 0.29 0.42 
2004-05 0.36 0.28 0.29 
2005-06 0.50 0.23 0.36 
2006-07 0.24 0.36 0.35 
2007-08 0.19 0.38 0.47 
2008-09 0.32 0.40 0.21 
2009-10 0.41 0.40 0.27 
2010-11 0.30 0.40 0.27 
2011-12 0.33 0.49 0.39 
2012-13 0.27 0.23 0.30 
2013-14 0.37 0.57 0.37 
2014-15 0.36 0.43 0.43 
2015-16 0.43 0.29 0.39 
 
Table 6: Competition for survival  
Season 
Premier  
League 
Football League 
Championship League One League Two 
2002-03 0.43 0.16 0.17 0.10 
2003-04 0.22 0.29 0.17 0.11 
2004-05 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.16 
2005-06 0.39 0.23 0.10 0.11 
2006-07 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.18 
2007-08 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.14 
2008-09 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.12 
2009-10 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.24 
2010-11 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
2011-12 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.12 
2012-13 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.04 
2013-14 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.09 
2014-15 0.15 0.27 0.13 0.14 
2015-16 0.31 0.30 0.23 0.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Best, worst and average HICB by league  
 
